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Rights; to a More Perfect Union*
CHARLES E. CLARKi
It is indeed a pleasure to journey to this great University, to renew ties
with the distinguished scholars of your faculty, and to speak to you on
matters of abiding legal and public interest. What I intend to discuss
here concerns the two greatest interests of my professional life: the im-
provement of the administration of justice under professional leadership,
notably that of the federal courts; and the aspiration for and ever-growing
accomplishment of national unity for our country wherein the participat-
ing assistance of the federal courts is a major factor.
The trend of my remarks is shown by my selection of a title based upon
those dynamic words from the Preamble to our Constitution, "in Order
to form a more perfect Union." And that is what I hope to see and be-
lieve I find-a trend to ever greater national unity, with the federal
judicial establishment taking a vital part. Of course the courts are not
alone in this movement; the executive and the legislative branches of
government can and often do as much or more, notably in times of crisis
such as war. But the courts are open and active every day of the year,
including, as I have found, often on Sundays. They have perpetual calls
to serve as arms of government; and thus the federal courts in particular
have a priceless opportunity for leadership and for accomplishment to-
ward the goal I visualize.
You will note that I start with an assumed premise, namely, that the
goal of national unity is not only desirable, but its achievement is neces-
sary for our very survival. Perhaps this must be taken on faith or not at
all. But, however arrived at, it seems to me clearly demonstrable on all
sides. Every year the interconnection of our people nationally becomes
the clearer; on financial, on economic, on welfare, on cultural levels, it
is as impossible as it is undesirable to try to extricate one area of our
country from another and treat it separately. And in the international
field, certainly we cannot execute the world leadership now thrust upon
us, or even safeguard our own future, if we remain a divided nation of
merely separate states. My thesis is that in the particular professional
area which is the subject of my present consideration, while the courts
* Address delivered at Law Day, University of Texas, April 7, 1961, and revised for
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have done much toward the desired goal, they should actually do more.
To some of my hearers this moderate complaint that the activity of the
federal judiciary has been, if anything, too limited may seem strange.
And yet I am confident that it can be sustained by certain examples from
the field of court administration and procedure. As I have had occasion to
say elsewhere: "While events national and international do steadily
press our people into a closer union, the national courts alone make their
possibly gallant, but surely eventually futile, attempts to restore states-
rightism."1
It is important to recall how the federal courts came into existence.
You will remember that under the federal constitution the only court
specifically named is the Supreme Court of the United States, and then
the Constitution goes on to provide for "such inferior Courts"-a quite
deserved description of course--"such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish. ' 2 As we know, there was a
debate in the First Congress as to whether or not there should be national
courts for the new and struggling republic. Such courts are not a neces-
sity. Two of the outstanding examples of federalism in the world today,
Canada and Australia, have no such system. In those quite successful
governments the provincial or state courts enforce both the provincial
or state law and the federal or national law, subject only to appeal to
the highest court, the Supreme Court of Canada or the Supreme Court
of Australia. We do not constitutionally need these courts; but the Con-
gress early decided that a federal judicial establishment would have value
as adding to the prestige, the strength, and the power of the federal
government. The federal courts were thus set up as a proper adjunct and
enforcing authority for the struggling federal government. That was the
origin, the beginning, of national unity. It was the great opinions of John
Marshall which started the government off as a potentially powerful
and authoritative exponent of the people's wishes. This remains true even
though during the middle years of our country's existence there occurred
a falling off of this drive, so that national power became weakened only
to experience a vast resurgence during the past two or three generations.
What I have to say is directed particularly to the law students of to-
day, the young people who in a short time (perhaps a couple of decades)
will be occupying positions of trust as lawyers, judges, and public officials
and who will have the opportunity and the power to shape our legal
destiny along lines I now urge. Let me summarize my argument. I sug-
gest first that now our national courts are showing the leadership, which
for many years they did not grasp, in activity for the improvement of
1 p. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14, 17 (24 Cir. 1951) (dissenting
opinion).
2 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, 1.
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the administration of justice. Next I shall discuss certain doctrines of
public importance, mainly, though not wholly, in the constitutional field,
which bear on my general topic. Finally I shall come to some of these
doctrines, now newly developed, which seem an undesirable interference
with these trends toward national unity. Here I may seem to join for a
bit that class of critics of the United States Supreme Court which my
co-speaker has properly questioned; 3 but actually my mild remarks are
quite from the opposite point of view. For, as I have earlier indicated, my
own conviction is that the Court, as leader of us in the constitutionally
inferior courts, has not gone very far in promoting national trends and
actually has not gone as far or as helpfully as it could have done or is
likely to do in the future. Indeed, all the many things it does and will do
in the direction of national unity are to my mind a vitally necessary
part of its constitutional function. So I wish that the whole court, not
merely some frequent dissenters, would participate gloriously in realiz-
ing the potential for national unity which the federal judicial system
presents.
To amplify this headnote I shall first speak of the federal courts as
leaders in the movement for the improvement of the administration of
justice. What time actually they lost by being unimportant and insig-
nificant! Very likely that was not their fault. How does one become sig-
nificant? Well, I would not know except that some persons or institutions
are propelled by the greatness of events. And now the federal courts can
hardly avoid the pressure for leadership. All the things they are called on
to do are certainly unusual and extensive, so extensive in fact that even
a federal judge cannot begin to know all his jurisdiction. Every so often
we federal judges have a new form of appeal in some quite different legal
territory, such as an appeal from the Secretary of Agriculture, or an
appeal from some examiner of the Naturalization, Service, in form an
appeal from the Attorney General, and so on. In any event there is
infinite diversity in the kinds of things that we are called on to do.
Unfortunately for many years the federal courts took or held no
position of leadership in this reform movement. Even in the time, which
does not seem so long ago, when I was in law school the federal courts
were a practically unknown territory. I can remember when in the year
1912 with a few others I wandered into a course in federal procedure,
which counted for only a single hour credit; the professor was obviously
bored and made a few general references to the very terrible practice
in the federal courts. Then one day when we came in he said, "Well, I
think that we had better disband. The Supreme Court has passed new
3 Anthony Lewis, Washington correspondent of the New York Times, who spoke on
the same program. See Lewis, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, 45 MINN. L. Rnv.
305 (1961).
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equity rules, and there isn't anything more to teach." Those were the
federal equity rules of 1912, a very good beginning in the way of reform,
but, as we know, only a bare beginning.4 To this professor they were so
extensive that they had blotted out all he knew and all that he thought
we should know. But think of all the major reform from that timid be-
ginning! First we must note the campaign of the American Bar Associ-
ation for adoption of the legislation granting rule-making power to the
Supreme Court, which was passed after the Association gave up the
battle as one not able to be accomplished and perhaps not even worth-
while to be accomplished. It was my own associate at the Connecticut
Bar, Attorney General Cummings, who took up the fight and pushed
the legislation through, to his eternal credit. The statute was passed in
1934 and was soon followed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
adopted in 1935-37 and effective in 1938.5
It is not here necessary to go into the details of the accomplishments
* made by the rules; they are now known to the profession generally.
One may mention merely the complete union of law and equity, the
simple allegations of the pleadings proper, the discovery process, the un-
complicated method of appeal, among other advantages of the new pro-
cedure.6 But I do want to speak here of their total effect. Not only did
they revolutionize the procedure throughout the great federal judicial
establishment of some ninety District Courts, together with various other
federal courts that have copied the procedure, such as the Court of Claims
and the several courts of the District of Columbia, but additionally they
have been widely copied in the several states. There now appear to be
some twenty jurisdictions which have copied them in full. There are an
additional six or seven which have rather complete reforms following
the federal principles in various details without adopting the system
in toto.7 Perhaps some of you may remember that when Texas joined
this latter group of states in 1941, I was brash enough to publish an ar-
tide in this Review twenty years ago expressing my regret that you had
not gone further and my hope that you would do so in time.8 I under-
stand you are still making progress with perhaps a major part of the
federal practice at hand and only a short distance left to go. Beyond these
are additionally perhaps a dozen states which have adopted substantial
4 226 U.S. 645 (app. 1). For references, see CLAuc, CODE PLE-ADING 33 (2d ed. 1947).
5 This history has been often traced; a succinct summary appears in CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 34-45 (21 ed. 1947); and see Clark Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules,
58 COLuM. L. REv. 435, 438-43 (1958).
6 See general references given in the citations in note 5 supra.
7 For details see Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24- F.R.D. 85 (1959); 1
BARRON & HOLTZOFIF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PnocEmuRE § 9-9.53 (Wright ed. 1960).
8 Clark, The Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 TEXAs L. REy. 4
(1941).
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segments of the federal system, such as the discovery or the joinder pro-
visions, while the famous pre-trial rule, Rule 16, is almost universally
available. Moreover, there are promising movements approaching
fruition in other areas, and there is now hardly a state where there is
not agitation among the bar for the federal rules.'
It is an interesting fact that, whenever there is agitation for improve-
ment, the federal system is assumed to be the model which must be
studied. Since now the bar associations and the profession generally are
acquiring the knowledge and the responsibility that they should have
assumed long ago and are taking a real and active interest in promoting
reform, the leadership of the federal system, whether that system is
adopted in toto or in part, is basic. No lawyer in this legal area can now
be so blind or so obtuse as not to know where the leadership is located.
That, I believe, should be a source of real satisfaction and of pride for
our profession, which has stimulated and fostered the reform.10
The other modern great improvement in court administration is the
correlative one for the organized court, or the integrated court as it is
more generally termed, the court with definite businesslike leadership
covering a wide area as a unit and not as little isolated independent units
or conflicting groups. The movement for the integrated court also started
with the federal courts. It began with the Administrative Court Act of
1939 creating the Administrative Office of the United States Courts."
Since then it has been taken up, and the central idea of the administrative
office has been widely adopted. Some twenty-eight states now have it."'
What should occur behind and with this, the underlying unified organi-
zation of the entire court structure, has not gone as far. As yet, the only
place where it has been completely achieved is our new Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico. It is a source of pride to me that I had a share in that
development, serving as consultant for the new Judiciary Act of 1952.
That was as stimulating an experience as I ever had; the island legis-
lators, executive office, and supreme court acted in effect as founding
fathers, rising to the responsibility and the need of original action, freeing
themselves of the inhibitions of the past. The result is a real triumph of
professional organizing and execution.' 3
9 See references, note 7 supra. The pending extensive movements are noted in cur-
rent issues of the Journal of the American Judicature Society.
10 Unlike the English movement, which was lay inspired and carried through, as
noted below. See note 19 infra.
28 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1958).
12 See references in 43 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 25 (1959); 44 1. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 104-105
(1960); VANDERBILT, MINI UM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADIINIST ATION 29-64
(1949); A.B.A. HANDROOK. THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
27-34 (3d ed. 1952), 11-19, 137-39 (4th ed. 1961).
13 Clark & Rogers, The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive Court Re-
organization, 61 YALE L.J. 1147 (1952); Elliott, "Our Faith in Justice": Puerto Rico
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At the same time and during this period there had been a long struggle
in my own State of Connecticut for the improvement of the minor court
system, primarily the traffic and police courts and the justices of the
peace. In this, too, I was privileged to participate. In 1949, as director of
a survey unit set up by the Commission on State Government Organi-
zation, organized by Governor Bowles, I made a report setting up a form
of unified court organization, 14 which after some ten years of agitation
has gone into effect.15 It was a spirited struggle, which only began to
make headway when the State Bar Association of Connecticut and the
League of Women Voters both took up the program and rendered yeo-
man's service. Finally Governor Ribicoff gave the final push before going
to the national scene in Washington as Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare; and the new circuit court system, supplanting by a state
organized court all the various police, town, city, and justice of the peace
courts, came into existence on January 1, 1961. It provided the most
advanced form of minor court organization in the continental United
States, and appears to be working with quiet efficiency, to the general
satisfaction of the public.' 6
Elsewhere, too, the waters of reform are stirring. Thus New Jersey
under the leadership of Chief Justice Vaiiderbilt early set the tone for
the whole movement, and many of the reforms advocated by him have
never been improved upon. Even in that state, however, the reorgani-
zation has been on the upper level of courts, not the minor courts where
it is most needed. But there are important reforms along these lines now
pending in a whole series of states: Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin; Iowa,
where the provisions were defeated the first time at the polls and will be
voted on again this fall; Illinois, where the prospects seem good; and at
length in Maine, where at local request there was prepared by the Insti-
tute of Judicial Administration an outstanding report setting up a corn-
Shows the Way to Better Courts, 42 A.B.A.I. 24 (1956). The valuable annual reports
of Puerto Rico's Administrative Director of its courts show that this early promise is
being fulfilled.
'4 FINAL REPORT OF SURVEY UNrr No. 18 oF CoMmiIssioN oN STATE GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION (Conn. 1949, mimeo.); REPoRT oF CoMMissioN ON STATE GovERNMET
ORGANIZATION 61 (Conn. 1950); Clark & Clark, Court Integration in Connecticut:
A Case Study of Steps in Judicial Reform, 59 YALE L.. 1395 (1950); Clark & Clark,
A Proposal for Court Reform in Connecticut, 24 CoNx. B.I. 385 (1950).
'1 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-248 to 51-274 (Supp. 1959). See DaroRY AND
MANUAL, Cmcurr COURT OF CONNETICUT (Jan. 1, 1961); 43 1. Am. JUD. Soc'y 25, 26,
(1959); 42 J. AM. JUn. Soc'Y 199 (1959); E. Clark, Court Reorganization in 1959:
A Time for Constructive Action, 32 CONN. B.J. 236 (1958); McCormick, The Struggle
for Probate Court Reform, 33 CoNN. B.J. 267 (1959).
16 Complaints have involved only minor and soon corrected details. Informal polls of
the bar have shown approval. Opinions of the new court's appellate tribunal now
appear regularly in the reports known as the Connecticut Supplement.
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plete district court system, which in due course has been adopted by the
legislature."' In at least three-fourths of the states there has been this
drive for improvement in court organization. 8 It is gratifying to note
that, even if the federal courts may be held to have started the movement,
the states are now going beyond the federal model to provide not only
for a central administrative office, but also for a revamped court structure.
That is as it should be, because now, in turn, it should be their function
to pull the federal courts forward. I am gratified to add that all this is a
reform professionally inspired and professionally developed, quite unlike
the similar 100-year struggle in England, which was led and sparked by
laymen.'19 It is a development, now continually broadening and expand-
ing, which does honor to the profession and of which the profession may
well be proud.
Now I shall turn to the other branch of the discussion I have planned,
namely, a consideration of the federal courts as active and continuous
instruments of national progress. This we see every day. I referred to it
earlier in speaking of all the new types of federal rights and of litigation
constantly arising which involve entirely novel issues. Here the tone is
set for us by the legislature or perhaps by the executive as leader in
recommending new legislation of vast and extensive character. A striking
example of what this means was presented on my first visit to Puerto
Rico as member of a commission composed of continental and island
lawyers and public officials sent to determine the extent of the application
of general federal regulatory laws to the new commonwealth. Though I
remain grateful for this introduction to a most progressive community,
the actual assignment was really so simple that it hardly deserved atten-
tion. For we found, as should have been expected, that the national laws
applied everywhere, and certainly to this part of our country. One had
only to study the wide coverage expressly stated by Congress as to the
National Labor Relations Act, or the various securities acts, or the like;
these showed by their terms that Congress intended them to apply to all
states, territories, and possessions without exception. And this was our
conclusion.20
In my judgment this trend toward nationalism must continue. I do
not see how it can possibly be stopped; moreover, I do not think it should
170n the Maine reform, see A Dism ucT CoUrT FOR MAINE, REPORT BY THE INSTITUTE
oF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, Legislative Research Committee Publication No. 100-4,
January, 1961; 45 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 75 (1961); 44 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 224 (1961).
18 Again the columns of the Journal of the American Judicature Society may be ex-
amined for all the late developments throughout the country.
19 Compare Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARv. L.
REv. 725 (1926).
20 REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY CoMmissIoN ON THE RELATION OF FEDIAL LA-Ws
TO PUEaTO Baco (1949).
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be. For the national government is there to work for all of us and in all
sorts of ways. One need only mention the social security legislation, to
cite an outstanding example which is affecting all of us and which by
the way is supplying us with a great deal of judicial business. This steady
development serves to convince me that I am speaking the language at
least of the future in urging a judicial awareness and acceptance of this
trend to national unity.
This brings me to the bearing on our subject matter of the three pres-
ently important doctrines of the Supreme Court about which I wish to
speak. These are, first, the use of federal habeas corpus to review state
criminal convictions; second, the extreme resurgence of state law in the
federal courts as an outgrowth of the teachings of Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kns;21 and finally, that willful, perhaps even illegitimate, child of the
Erie-Tompkins rule, namely, the "abstention doctrine." As will be seen,
the first seems a desirable, even a necessary step toward making this a
really great country not only in our own eyes, but in the eyes of the world
generally. But as to the other two, I am most doubtful; indeed, I seriously
question if they do represent the way of the future.
First we may note the developing law as to the federal habeas corpus.
This is truly a troublesome part of our appellate jurisdiction. In indi-
vidual cases I find it very burdensome because continuously we are
having to review the careful judgments of two great state courts, the
New York Court of Appeals and the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors.22 This is an embarrassing jurisdiction. Mloreover, it is a heavy
one, vastly increasing our judicial business. In fact it has gone so far
that we have had to appoint a special clerk to assist us in processing these
cases. When I was chief judge of our court I had a daily correspondence
with the inmates of all the various New York prisons. Often I would have
to pay postage due, to obtain delivery of these handwritten, almost
illegible requests for federal intervention. This whole course of judicial
trend is a vastly interesting one; while for the individual judge the task
is heavy, yet the total effect on the administration of the criminal law I
am quite sure is wholly to the good.
In a notable lecture at Harvard, one of our great state judges, Justice
Schaefer, pointed out that this trend is due not entirely or perhaps even
mainly to definite Supreme Court rulings, but is more the result of a
growth in knowledge by the prisoners, aided by the privileges granted in
the prisons of allowing the inmates to study judicial cases and authori-
ties.23 It is a fact that any decision of our court or of the Supreme Court
21 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22 As yet we have not been called upon to review such a judgment of the third great
court in our circuit, the Supreme Court of Vermont, though it is rumored that at least
one such case is on its way to us.
2 3 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1956).
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in this field will be known all through the prisons of our local area within
a week, by which time there will be petitions coming to us citing and
quoting them. As an interesting facet of the problem, it might be noted
that the warden of the Clinton State Prison for incorrigibles at Danne-
mora, New York, is reported to look upon this judicial trend with favor,
since it makes possible the best therapeutic treatment he can find for his
patients. Thus the inmates are all studying law and drafting petitions to
the judges; even though most of them may not have substance, it does
give the prisoners an interest in life and a hope which does marvels for
their morale.
In truth, however, the administration of the criminal law has not been
all that it should be throughout the Union. Thus the problem arises even
in my own state, where we have fondly thought that justice was pretty
well administered, but where, as it turns out, there are police practices
of which we cannot be proud. In a recent case a Negro accused of murder
was taken without a warrant to the prosecutor's office, handcuffed to his
chair, and cross-examined steadily from II a.m. to 11 p.m. Even more,
he was fooled into thinking that like pressure was being exercised on his
wife until he finally confessed to save her. That particular case has been
pending through the courts for some time until at long length it has been
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.24 And there are
other disquieting cases.25 But it is perhaps a hopeful sign that one of the
youthful prosecutors frankly stated that he and his colleagues were
troubled by these reversals, that they did not want to engage in illegal
practices and were trying to improve their procedures, and that it was
their desire to do what was required by the highest court and to do it
quite honestly and consistently. So I do believe we can perceive a marked
improvement in criminal law administration in the courts which come
under our notice.
In this connection Justice Schaefer in his Holmes lectures at Harvard
has a statement that is quite true and directly in point, namely, that,
while considerations of federalism of course remain important, yet "in
the world today they must be measured against the competing demands
arising out of the relation of the United States to the rest of the world.
The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the
methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law. That measure is
not taken merely in retrospect by social historians of the future. It is
taken from day to day by the peoples of the world, and to them the crim-
24 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
25 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 668 (1961), reversing State v. Culombe,
147 Conn. 194, 158 A.2d 239 (1960); and compare U. S. ex rel. Reid v. Richmond,
-F. d- (2d Cir. 1961).
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inal procedure sanctioned by any of our states is the procedure sanctioned
by the United States. '2 6 So even if individual decisions may seem to push
rather far, the desirable trend is unmistakable.
I shall now turn to the other two doctrines that I wish to explore. At
the very time that this trend of nationalism was happily developing in
1938 there came the ruling in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins27 that it was illegal,
nay, unconstitutional, for the federal courts not to apply state law in the
cases that came to the federal courts in their diversity-of-citizenship
jurisdiction over actions by citizens of one state against those of another.
This is a type of local jurisdiction placed in the federal courts, as opposed
to the other great branch of our jurisdiction, that of the federal question
which covers the cases about which I have heretofore been speaking. The
original Erie decision was perhaps not one to raise overmuch question,
even though it did overrule a decision of one hundred years' standing,
that of Swift v. Tyson.28 For I believe it clear that judges in general
sitting in the federal courts would wish to apply the same law where
applicable as. did their state brothers in like case. It is not the basic prin-
ciple of Erie, but rather the extent to which it has been pressed, which
causes us trouble. Particularly is this true when it is said that anything
which significantly affects the outcome of the action must be held a
matter of state law . 9 This can reach even to matters of mere procedure,
so that federal advances in that area must be rejected in a particular case
for the outworn practices of a backward state.
3 0
Such a rule carries this very delicate question of federalism, of the
interrelationship of federal and state rights, to an extreme, even, I sug-
gest, to an absurd extreme. Consider, for example, a question that has
not yet been finally decided, but is continually recurring, namely, the
problem of trial by jury. The specific issue is often as to the sufficiency of
the evidence in a civil action to present a jury question. If you press the
Erie doctrine to its ultimate conclusion you must say that, since the
ruling here will significantly affect the outcome of the action, it must
26 Schaefer, supra note 23, at 26.
27304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28 41 U. S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
29 This is the famous "outcome-determinative" test set forth in Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 US. 99 (1945), and since often reiterated. Compare Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), with Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
30 Of the many facets of this problem a most interesting one has just appeared in
my court. In Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961), the
majority applied Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) to support a liberal ruling for the admission of
certain evidence contrary to the state practice; the dissenting judge, however, arguing
at length that Erie and York compelled a different result, concluded that the decision
"I believe puts an end to any of the relevant principles of Erie v. Tompkins and Guar-
anty Trust v. York."
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be governed by state law. And yet the United States Constitution defi-
nitely covers the subject of trial by jury and it does seem a bit extreme
to hold state law above and controlling the Constitution of the United
States in a court of the United States on this most important personal
right31
As Erie has been pushed further and further by new ramifications of
the "qutcome-determinative" test, another and somewhat similar doctrine
has emerged which limits the freedom of federal judges to deal with
matters of state law. This is the "abstention" doctrine, which says that
in certain cases involving questions of state law the federal judge must
"abstain" from deciding cases within his jurisdiction until a state court
can define the state law in question.3 2 This doctrine, always an unfortu-
nate one, has grown considerably from its humble beginning as a discre-
tionary device used to forestall decision of a federal constitutional
question in cases involving complicated questions of state administrative
and regulatory policy. Moreover, it appears to be emplpyed even in
cases where no constitutional issues are present and where no particularly
delicate matters of state policy are at stake. It has been used in cases
where the court has jurisdiction on diversity grounds, as well as when
jurisdiction is based solely on a federal question." Because a majority
of the Supreme Court has continued to insist on this principle, it has
come to seem more mandatory than discretionary. As a result of this
doctrine, individual litigants have been shuffled back and forth between
state and federal courts, and cases have been dragged out over eight- and
ten-year periods.34
Last year a divided Supreme Court decided a case which seems an ex-
treme example of this unhappy doctrine. The case, Clay v. Sun Ins. Office
Ltd.,,5 was a diversity action brought in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida. Before coming to Florida, the plain-
tiff had taken out a personal property insurance policy with the de-
fendant's Illinois office. His property, now located in Florida, was subse-
31 See Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931); Dick v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 444, 446 (1959); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative,
356 U.S. 525 (1958); Trivette v. New York Life Ins. Co., 283 F.2d 441, 443-49 (6th
Cir. 1960) (Pope, J., dissenting).32 Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 Tmx.s L. RaT. 815 (1959);
Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 H.Av. L. Rnv. 1358 (1960);
Note, Judicial Abstention from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 CoLum. L. REv.
749 (1959).
"3For illustrative cases see Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Thompson v. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); and
Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960), discussed below. Other cases are
cited in Wright, supra note 32.
34 For examples see the authorities cited in note 32 supra.
35363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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quently damaged; but the insurance company disclaimed liability, con-
tending that the particular damage (done by Clay's estranged wife) was
not covered by the policy, and that in any event Clay's action was barred
by the one-year-limitation provision of the policy. Clay, however, pointed
to a Florida statute making all such contractual limitations upon institut-
ing suit "contrary to public policy" and "illegal and void." The district
judge applied this statute and, following a jury verdict for Clay, refused
defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that, since the contract was made in Illi-
nois and the "suit clause" was valid there, the Fourteenth Amendment
required Florida to recognize the limitation and to refuse to hear the
case. Because of this constitutional ruling, that court did not reach the
question whether or not Florida would, in fact, apply its statute to the
Illinois-made contract.36
With the case in this posture a majority of the Supreme Court held the
Fifth Circuit in error in deciding a question of constitutional law before
resolving an issue of state law which might make a constitutional pro-
nouncement unnecessary. Then the Court said that the district judge
had also been wrong to decide that question of state law for himself. For
the majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that no federal court could
make a "confident guess" how the Florida Supreme Court would con-
strue the statute, and that the proper solution was for the federal court to
refer that question to the state court for a decision. So the parties, who
had come all the way up through the federal system, now had to repair
to the Florida Supreme Court for its opinion of the meaning of the state
statute. And still ahead of them lay a further climb through the federal
courts, once Florida had spoken.
Actually the question of law involved in the case does not appear to
be particularly complex. It called for statutory interpretation of the
sort that all our courts have regularly to make. To the dissenting Justices
it gave little trouble. For Justice Black, speaking for the three dissenters,
the question was quite simple: "The statute's plain language, its in-
terpretation by the experienced trial judge who sat on the case and its
interpretation by the Attorney General of the State should be sufficient
to show to even the most doubtful that this state law applies to this
printed provision of the contract and requires the company to try this
lawsuit on its merits."3 7 And Justice Douglas added the practical com-
ment:
I desire to give renewed protest to our practice of making litigants
travel a long, expensive road in order to obtain justice.... Some liti-
gants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly afford one law-
3GSun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
373 63 U.S. at 216. And so the Florida Supreme Court has now held. Sun. Ins. Office
Ltd. v. Clay, 30 U.S.L. WEE 2202 (Fla. Oct. 18, 1961).
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suit, let alone two. Shuttling the parties between state and federal
tribunals is a sure way of defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit
of justice is not an academic exercise. There are no foundations to
finance the resolution of nice state law questions involved in federal
court litigation. The parties are entitled-absent unique and rare
situations-to adjudication of their rights in the tribunals which
Congress has empowered to act.38
The reason for forcing federal judges to "abstain" in a case like Clay,
despite the practical consequences so vividly described by Justice Doug-
las, seems similar to the reasons which have led to extreme applications
of the ','outcome-determinative" test. These cases relegate the federal
judge to the role of an automaton or, as my late colleague Judge Frank
put it;"' a "ventriloquist's dummy." He must, it seems, slavishly follow
decisions of state courts, even lower courts, no matter how ill-advised or
outmoded these decisions may be, and how unlikely they are now to be
followed in the state courts themselves. And he is called upon to follow
state practice whenever the issue is "outcome-determinative," no matter
how deep the inroads into federal methods of administering justice.40
Abstention now pushes the logic one step further: it removes the federal
judge entirely from the picture.
In the reasons given for these parallel developments there seems to be
present a fear of what federal judges will do if not tightly leashed by
doctrinal restraints. Either they will commit plain error or, in the course
of deciding matters of "state" law, they will impose their values and
make policy from their point of view. So this will not only increase the
risk of later state rejections of the rule, but create the kind of federal-state
conflict which leads to forum-shopping.4' To avoid these evils a Court
majority still imprisons our federal judges in the narrow confines of the
"outcome-determinative" test or separates them from decision completely
by the abstention principle.
Perhaps one reason for these developments is the same discovery
about the way our courts work which helped to bring about the Erie de-
cision-the realization that the judicial process is not a mechanical proc-
ess of "finding" or "discovering" an already existing law, but quite often
38 363 U.S. at 227,228.
39 In Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942). See Clark, State
Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55
YALE L.J. 267, 284 (1946), reprinted in JnusPnuDMricE iN ACTION 53, 83-84 (1953).
40 Compare notes 30, 31 supra. The Court itself has often repudiated extreme appli-
cations of the principle. Thus contrast such a case as King v. Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948), with West v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940).
41 See Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HAnv. L. Rv. 1013, 1032 (1953).
This idea was expressed in the early case of Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
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the creative job of making new law.42 This involves also the recognition
that ultimately it is only the individual judge or judges to whom adjudi-
cation is committed who are responsible for the creation of such new
law. Somewhat like the development of atomic energy, these realizations
unleashed potent forces which had to be either harnessed or eliminated.
Widespread acceptance of the fact that judges in both private and public
law cases can, will, and do make policy for the community has had sig-
nificance throughout the law. It has been especially important in this
field of federal jurisdiction, because here we often have judges deciding
cases of another so-called "sovereignty." And in this sensitive area and
as an abstract doctrine it may be thought strange that federal judges
should have the right to "legislate" fo& the states. But reflection should
convince that it is the necessary and indeed desirable result of their
exercise of their constitutional and statutory jurisdiction.
So this truth-that the judicial process is creative, not static, that case
law is made, not found-has, it seems, contributed to the development
of the various forms of federal "abstention" I have been discussing: ab-
stention from the normal judicial job of creative decision-making under
Erie and abstention from any decision at all under cases like Clay. In my
view, advanced with deference, this is an attempt to avoid the unavoid-
able-to ask judges not to judge, not to exercise their judicial capacity or
the power of their minds, even though Congress and the Constitution
have given them jurisdiction over the case.
I have found a very interesting discussion of the Clay case by one of
my old students from my teaching days, who shows that fine tolerance
and fondness so happily found among one's former pupils. In a law
review article last fall Professor Cardozo of Cornell discussed this case 3
and used as a starting point an article by Professor Corbin-authority
on Contracts and my colleague for many years-which said that, not-
withstanding the Erie case, judges had to be judges and could not just be
automatons. Professor Corbin felt that federal judges ought to be able
to look at the same sources as are available to state judges in deciding
issues of state law; to survey all of what he called the "persuasive data,"
and not just the decisions of the courts. They must, in short, exercise
judicial capacity, even if that meant that they would contribute to the
growth and change of state law.44 Then Professor Cardozo mentioned a
42 Even Holmes thought the federal courts could only "declare," not "make," state
law. Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370-71 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
43 Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law. Deference to State Courts Versus
Federal Responsibility, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 419 (1960).
44Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.S. 762 (1941). Professor
Cardozo also cites Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts. The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YAi- L.J. 267, 290-95 (1946), reprinted in JuViISPRUDENCE IN
AcTIoN 53, 93-99 (1953).
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decision of mine where I had assumed, in Judge Hand's phrase, to look
into the "womb of time"4-9 and to forecast New York law before it had
appeared. There we looked at such "data" as Corbin on Contracts, the
relevant sections of the Restatement of Contracts--drafted in fact by
Corbin and Justice Cardozo-federal opinions, the published recommen-
dations of the New York Law Revision Commission, and analogous
provisions of New York law to reach a conclusion on the state of New
York law which could not have been made by a wooden recapitula-
tion of the law in terms of the old New York cases. 46
From this, Professor Cardozo, referring to Justice Douglas' dissent in
Clay, observed that Judge Clark and Justice Douglas were for many years
faculty colleagues of Professor Corbin at Yale and, continuing, said:
"Maybe the attitude toward the role of federal courts that had been
developing in interfaculty discussions in New Haven, in the years prior
to the Erie decision, was proceeding along a very different course from
the attitude being molded in Cambridge, where Felix Frankfurter was
still in residence. ' 47
On the whole this would seem to be giving the law schools and the law
reviews credit for more pervasive influence than is theirs in actuality.
But they do play an important part in present-day legal thinldng. That
is why the recent Great Debate in the potent Harvard Law Review as to
how well the present-day Supreme Court justices (and inferentially other
federal judges) are doing has close relevancy to our subject matter. At
any rate the discussion there as to whether the Supreme Court justices
are overworked has significant overtones. First Professor Hart charted
the justices' day, hour by hour, minute by minute, and even second by
second, and decided that they did not have time enough for all their
cases.4 8 I have seen a good many of the justices in action and I have seen
my own colleagues at work. And I cannot imagine a judge apportioning
his day by minutes or seconds. We spend time on the cases that draw our
attention. And this is certainly true of the Supreme Court justices, which
suggests an infallible, if perhaps hardly useful, rule to explain the enig-
ma of the grant of certiorari. As explained to me by a law professor,
formerly law clerk to a Supreme Court justice, the cases in which
certiorari is granted are those where the justices see an opportunity to
45 Spector Motor Serv. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J., dis-
senting), vacated 323 U.S. 101 (1944), quoted in Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle
Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103, 107 (91d Cir. 1953).
46 Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103, 107
(2d Cir. 1953). Cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 205-212
(1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
47 Cardozo, supra note 43, at 425.
48 Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term. Foreword. The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 H~iv. L. Rmv. 84 (1959). See answer, Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HAiv.
L. Rzv. 1298 (1960).
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write worthwhile opinions. What better test can there be? Since the
Court cannot take all of the cases offered it, it should well take those
where its role will be creative. So this apportionment of judicial time-
which has recently been emphasized by no less a person than Dean Gris-
wold himself- - - 9 seems an interesting question, as is anything concerning
the Court, but one a bit irrelevant. After all, the justices control their
own time. They determine the intake, and if they are overworked they
can stop the flow. Also they may appeal to Congress for further restric-
tion on their jurisdiction.
But the underlying thought that, just because the justices are tired
or overworked, their fundamental convictions about law and government
somehow become variable is to me dubious and even faintly ludicrous.
By the way, some of the justices assert flatly that they are not over-
worked-an interesting question of fact in itself.50 I say that, even if
they are, the issues that they daily work on are basic, fundamental
principles which go back of feelings of the moment. Thus I cannot con-
ceive, no matter how tired Mr. Justice Douglas is-perhaps being tired
is something one cannot associate with him-that that is going to make
him think differently about these problems. The same is true, I venture
to believe, as to Mr. Justice Black or Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The idea
that sitting mulling over these problems and hashing them over with
one's associates will change basic views is unusual, to say the least.51
Let me now refer to another attempt to state a general rule by another
scholar, a Columbia professor with close affiliations with his Harvard
opposites at Cambridge. Professor Herbert Wechsler, also delivering the
Holmes lectures reprinted in the Harvard Law Review,5 2 has tried to
work out the legal principle by which the Supreme Court should decide
whether it should adjudicate or should refrain from decision. His view
is that the Court should act only in those cases where it would be apply-
49 Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term. Foreword. Of Time and Attitudes-
Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 H~Mv. L. RBv. 81 (1960).
50 Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 Conx m L.Q. 401 (1960).
See also Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 865 (1960); Brennan, The Bill of
Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 761 (1961). Compare T. C. Clark Internal
Operation of the United States Supreme Court, 43 J. AM. Jun. SoC'Y 45 (1959).
51 Dean Griswold seems to be particularly upset at the thought that discussion will
not produce a change of conviction or, to put it more bluntly (as he does not), that
the views of mature thinking men on basic fundamentals cannot be shifted by argu-
mentative processes. See Griswold, supra note 49, at 91-94. I wonder how many mem-
bers of his own faculty can be shifted in their lifetime views by the sweet reasonable-
ness of argument. Of course there is an area of adjustment-where the case is not yet
understood, or the facts remain debatable, or the divisions are not on basic issues, etc.
But the questions to which we are addressing ourselves are basic, where convictions
run deep. Compare note 60 infra; and see also like concern expressed in Fuller, The
Academic Lauvyers "House of Intellect," 14 3. LEGAL En. 153, 157-59 (1961).
52 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 InMv. L. REv.
1, 15 (1959).
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ing principles of adequate neutrality and generality; cases which do not
survive this test should not be heard by that Court. This idea, I under-
stand, has achieved present popularity in the law schools. But trying to
apply such a test as a working principle and looking at the examples
given-about the applicability of which there seems serious division-
the conclusion I am compelled to reach seems to be that the cases which
interest me always satisfy the principle; and this is particularly true of
cases where my colleagues are mistaken and I must dissent. The practical
application of this famous principle strikes me as just that personal.
I suggest the real answer to all this attempt to differentiate among
issues legally before the court is that it cannot be done in any way which
will carry conviction as to those issues left out.53 And in a broader sense
I find the appropriate conclusion to be that expressed by a former law
clerk of mine, Professor George Braden, then at Yale. Back in 1948 in
discussing "The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law," he
reached this conclusion, which I suggest is unanswerable and which I
believe applies to much more than merely constitutional cases: "There
is no objectivity in constitutional law because there are no absolutes.
Every constitutional question involves a weighing of competing
values .... Hence the justice who wants to tell the world how he decides
cases ... must say: 'This is what I believe is important in our civilization
and I shall do all I can to preserve it.' And forthwith set forth his creed.
If this is too shocking to society . . ., then society must take away the
Court's power. There is no middle ground.-14 The same idea I find ex-
pressed in other important critiques of the neutrality principle.55 Of
course this is by no means a new concept.5 6 In fact since Justice Cardozo's
53 This is convincingly shown by Judge Arnold in his defense of the Court's grant
of certiorari to review state court reversals of FELA verdicts and thus to uphold the
constitutional right of trial by jury. Arnold, supra note 48, at 1300-1304. Strangely
some scholars seem to believe that they have demolished Judge Arnold's "philosophy,"
without taking note of the practical and common-sense conclusions he has to present
on the operation of the judicial process. Compare Fuller, supra note 51; and the colloquy
between Professors Fuller and Jones, 14 J. LEGAL ED. 165-67 (1961).
54 Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YAI.E LJ. 571, 594
(1948).55 Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral Principles, 7 U.C.LA. L. REv. 571
(1960); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27
U. Cm. L. REv. 661 (1960); Henson, A Criticism of Criticism: In re Meaning, 29
Foan HAm L. Ra,. 553 (1961).
56 "Judges prefer a formula-for that is what it is-that they merely declare the law
and do not make it." RAncrLws, Tun LAw AND ITS CoMPAss 38-39 (1960), discussing"public policy" as "an unruly horse," as stated by Burrough, J., in Richardson v.
Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (C. P. 1824). Quoted by Keeffe in his
Practicing Lawyer's guide to the current Law Magazines, 47 A.B.A.J. 930, 931 (1961).
But see CAmDozo, Tn NATURE o THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 115 (1921): "The law which
is the resulting product is not found, but made. The process, being legislative, demands
the legislator's wisdom."
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The Nature of the Judicial Process, it has been made quite articulate. 7
But, notwithstanding Justice Cardozo's famous lectures and the labors
of others, notably the legal realists, the search for some absolutes control-
ling judicial adjudication still goes on. What a vain hope! Dean Griswold
goes so far as t6 suggest that in one case Cardozo said a perfectly mean-
ingless thing when he said, "Life in all its fullness must supply the
answer to the riddle" with respect to a tax question then before the Su-
preme Court.58 I must admit that this is a bit flowery, but I think the
substance is an appropriate statement. Indeed, I am disturbed by at-
tempts to classify under high-sounding names principles of judicial
process which are not so classifiable. There is a new book in this field
by Professor Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition-Deciding
Appeals, which is being greatly honored by the reviewers. It seems to
me, however, that the distinguished author and leading realist has some-
what retreated to the idea that one can state abstract principles of
objective generality for the operation of the judicial process.59 After all,
one has to know the individual judge who in much of his work, particu-
larly as to original cases, must sail uncharted seas. Of course he is re-
strained by many things that are worthwhile: tradition, his own train-
ing, his own place in society, and the like. Particularly is he restrained
by the obligation to set forth the reasons for his action in language for
all to read and for the West Publishing Company to publish and sell to
all lawyers at a substantial price. But nevertheless at bottom he is an
individual and acts alone. These attempts at explanations to set a course
which must be followed I think are unfortunate, because they mislead
the lawyers and the public and worst of all they mislead the judge him-
self and improperly circumscribe his thinking. He cannot avoid his lonely
responsibility and should not be told he may. Thus he may appear to
rest judgment on some older precedent or past history, but the ultimate
job is his.6 0
5
7 CArDozo, THE NATURE op THE 'UDICL PROCEss (1921), particularly Lecture III.
The Method of Sociology. The Judge as a Legislator. The same ideas are restated in
CA.,nozo, THE GROWTH ovr-TH LAW 93-108 passim (1924).58 Griswold, supra note 49, at 90, quoting from the opinion of Cardozo, 3., in Welch
v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933), repeated in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363
U.S. 278, 288 n.9 (1960). Note an early expression of this view in CRnozo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 113-15 (1921).
59 This conclusion is amplified and explained in an article, Clark & Trubeck, The
Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition,
appearing in the December issue of the Yale Law Journal.
60 Both Dean Griswold and Judge Learned Hand have expressed abhorrence at the
thought of being governed by "Plato's wise men" or "a bevy of Platonic guardians,"
the Dean going so far as to say "it makes me shiver a little bit." Griswold, supra note
49, at 93 n.48; HAND, THE BIL Op RiGHrs 73 (1958). With deference one may ask
where these distinguished men have been all these years. In fact they and we all have
settled for something less than "Plato's wise men," and have lived happily in our bond-
age. I perhaps should add the obvious and natural caution, as noted by commentators
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This trend of thinking, this attempt to set up absolute rules and guides,
seems to arise out of that same timidity in the face of our realization of
the creative role of the judge that attempts to bottle up our federal courts
and force them to abstain in one way or another from the job of the judge.
Every question of significance that comes before a court involves ques-
tions of competing values-constitutional matters are not unique in that.
And the choices have to be made, and by judges. To restrain that choice
by will-o'-the-wisp rules of so-called neutrality and objectivity is only to
guarantee that we will get the less imaginative and creative solutions to
our legal problems. Hence I regard these explanatory theses or excuses
to be unhelpful or worse. The court and its members have a responsi-
bility which cannot be shared. And when doctrines develop which are at
variance with that obligation to a united sovereignty which we in the
federal service peculiarly owe, I for one feel a duty to protest. Never-
theless I cannot believe that some of these essentially divisive doctrines-
the extreme application of the Erie rule, the "abstention" thesis-will
last. The idea that Florida might be upset at a decision on these simple
questions of law and of the meaning of statutes, as was presented in the
Clay case, seems to me a bit absurd when we consider that Florida may
have its murder convictions upset by a single federal judge on an applica-
tion for federal habeas corpus.
So, venturing the dangerous role of prophet, I will say boldly that I
do not believe these doctrines working against national unity can stand.
I suggest as an article of faith that our definite direction is to make our-
selves into a very great country, a country in which we all share as equals
and in the building of which the federal courts have a large and impor-
tant role to play. So I come back to my original sense of satisfaction that
I may speak to you young people, the law students of the day, who will
share so extensively in this noble job of construction. I realize how fool-
ish it is for an inferior judge to prophesy the course of doctrine or the
course of Supreme Court decision. But nevertheless, I shall take the risk.
I am going to venture the thought-and this you may check fifty years
hence-that what I am now saying will be even truer than I believe it
to be at this moment.
from Cardozo on, that the judge's range of choice of law is limited in many traditional
ways except in the statistically small, but important area of novel and original issues.
See CAmnozo, op. cit. supra note 57. This, too, is discussed elsewhere; see note 59 supra.
